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Abstract. In this paper, we make distinctions between
Classical Logic (where the propositions are 100% true, or
100 false) and the Neutrosophic Logic (where one deals
with partially true, partially indeterminate and partially
false propositions) in order to respond to K. Georgiev’s

criticism [1]. We recall that if an axiom is true in a classical logic system, it is not necessarily that the axiom be
valid in a modern (fuzzy, intuitionistic fuzzy, neutrosophic etc.) logic system.
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1 Single Valued Neutrosophic Set
We read with interest the paper [1] by K. Georgiev.
The author asserts that he proposes “a general simplification of the Neutrosophic Sets a subclass of theirs, comprising of elements of R3”, but this was actually done before,
since the first world publication on neutrosophics [2]. The
simplification that Georgiev considers is called single valued neutrosophc set.
The single valued neutrosophic set was introduced for
the first time by us [Smarandache, [2], 1998].
Let
n=t+i+f
(1)
In Section 3.7, “Generalizations and Comments”, [pp.
129, last edition online], from this book [2], we wrote:
“Hence, the neutrosophic set generalizes:
- the intuitionistic set, which supports incomplete set
theories (for 0 < n < 1; 0 ≤ t, i, f ≤ 1) and incomplete
known elements belonging to a set;
- the fuzzy set (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 ≤ t, i, f ≤ 1);
- the classical set (for n = 1 and i = 0, with t, f either 0
or 1);
- the paraconsistent set (for n > 1, with all t, i, f < 1);
- the faillibilist set (i > 0);
- the dialetheist set, a set M whose at least one of its
elements also belongs to its complement C(M); thus, the
intersection of some disjoint sets is not empty;
- the paradoxist set (t = f = 1);
- the pseudoparadoxist set (0 < i < 1; t =1 and f > 0 or
t > 0 and f = 1);
- the tautological set (i, f < 0).”
It is clear that we have worked with single-valued neutrosophic sets, we mean that t, i, f were explicitly real
numbers from [0, 1].
See also (Smarandache, [3], 2002, p. 426).
More generally, we have considered that: t varies in the

set T, i varies in the set I, and f varies in the set F, but in
the same way taking crisp numbers n = t + i + f, where all t,
i, f are single (crisp) real numbers in the interval [0, 1]. See
[2] pp. 123-124, and [4] pp. 418-419.
Similarly, in The Free Online Dictionary of Computing
[FOLDOC], 1998, updated in 1999, ed. by Denis Howe [3].
Unfortunately, Dr. Georgiev in 2005 took into consideration only the neutrosophic publication [6] from year
2003, and he was not aware of previous publications [2, 3,
4] on the neutrosophics from the years 1998 - 2002.
The misunderstanding was propagated to other authors
on neutrosophic set and logic, which have considered that
Haibin Wang, Florentin Smarandache, Yanqing Zhang,
Rajshekhar Sunderraman (2010, [5]) have defined the single valued neutrosophic set.
2 Standard and Non-Standard Real Subsets
Section 3 of paper [1] by Georgiev is called “Reducing
Neutrosophic Sets to Subsets of R3”. But this was done already since 1998. In our Section 0.2, [2], p. 12, we wrote:
“Let T, I, F be standard or non-standard real subsets…”.
“Standard real subsets”, which we talked about above,
mean just the classical real subsets.
We have taken into consideration the non-standard
analysis in our attempt to be able to describe the absolute
truth as well [i.e. truth in all possible worlds, according to
Leibniz’s denomination, whose neutrosophic value is equal
to 1+], and relative truth [i.e. truth in at least one world,
whose truth value is equal to 1]. Similarly, for absolute indeterminacy and absolute falsehood.
We tried to get a definition as general as possible for
the neutrosophic logic (and neutrosophic set respectively),
including the propositions from a philosophical point of
[absolute or relative] view.
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Of course, in technical and scientific applications we
do not consider non-standard things, we take the classical
unit interval [0, 1] only, while T, I, F are classical real subsets of it.
In Section 0.2, Definition of Neutrosophic Components
[2], 1998, p. 12, we wrote:
“The sets T, I, F are not necessarily intervals, but may
be any real sub-unitary subsets: discrete or continuous;
single-element, finite, or (countable or uncountable) infinite; union or intersection of various subsets; etc.
They may also overlap. The real subsets could represent the relative errors in determining t, i, f (in the case
when the subsets T, I, F are reduced to points).”
So, we have mentioned many possible real values for T,
I, F. Such as: each of T, I, F can be “single-element” {as
Georgiev proposes in paper [1]}, “interval” {developed
later in [7], 2005, and called interval-neutrosophic set and
interval-neutrosophic logic respectively}, “discrete”
[called hesitant neutrosophic set and hesitant neutrosophic
logic respectively] etc.
3 Degrees of Membership > 1 or < 0 of the Elements
In Section 4 of paper [1], Georgiev says that: “Smarandache has adopted Leibniz’s ‘worlds’ in his work, but it
seems to be more like a game of words.”
As we have explained above, “Leibniz’s worlds” are
not simply a game of words, but they help making a distinction in philosophy between absolute and relative truth /
indeterminacy / falsehood respectively. {In technics and
science yes they are not needed.}
Besides absolute and relative, the non-standard values
or hyper monads (-0 and 1+) have permitted us to introduce, study and show applications of the neutrosophic
overset (when there are elements into a set whose real
(standard) degree of membership is > 1), neutrosophic underset (when there are elements into a set whose real degree of membership is < 0), and neutrosophic offset (when
there are both elements whose real degree of membership
is > 1 and other elements whose real degree of membership
is < 0). Check the references [8-11].
4 Neutrosophic Logic Negations
In Section 4 of the same paper [1], Georgiev asserts
that “according to the neutrosophic operations we have
A  A
(2)
and since
A  A
(3)
is just the assumption that has brought intuitionism to life,
the neutrosophic logic could not be a generalization of any
Intuitionistic logic.”
First of all, Georgiev’s above assertation is partially
true, partially false, and partially indeterminate (as in the
neutrosophic logic).

In neutrosophic logic, there is a class of neutrosophic
negation operators, not only one. For some neutrosophic
negations the equality (2) holds, for others it is invalid, or
indeterminate.
Let A(t, i, f) be a neutrosophic proposition A whose
neutrosophic truth value is (t, i, f), where t, i, f are single
real numbers of [0, 1]. We consider the easiest case.
a) For examples, if the neutrosophic truth value of
A , the negation of A, is defined as:
(1-t, 1-i, 1-f) or (f, i, t) or (f, 1-i, t)
(4)
then the equality (2) is valid.
b) Other examples, if the neutrosophic truth value of
A , the negation of A, is defined as:
(f, (t+i+f)/3, t) or (1-t, (t+i+f)/3, 1-f)
(5)
then the equality (2) is invalid, as in intuitionistic fuzzy
logic, and as a consequence the inequality (3) holds.
c) For the future new to be designed/invented neutrosophic negations (needed/adjusted for new applications) we do not know {so (2) has also a percentage of indeterminacy.
5 Degree of Dependence and Independence between (Sub)Components
In Section 4 of [1], Georgiev also asserts that “The
neutrosophic logic is not capable of maintaining modal
operators, since there is no normalization rule for the
components T, I, F”. This is also partially true, and
partially false.
In our paper [12] about the dependence / independence
between components, we wrote that:
“For single valued neutrosophic logic, the
sum of the components t+i+f is:
0 ≤ t+i+f ≤ 3 when all three components are
100% independent;
0 ≤ t+i+f ≤ 2 when two components are 100%
dependent, while the third one is 100% independent from them;
0 ≤ t+i+f ≤ 1 when all three components are
100% dependent.
When three or two of the components t, i, f
are 100% independent, one leaves room for incomplete information (therefore the sum t+i +f <
1), paraconsistent and contradictory information
(t+i+f > 1), or complete information (t+i+f = 1).
If all three components t, i, f are 100% dependent, then similarly one leaves room for incomplete information (t+i+f < 1), or complete information (t+i+f = 1).”
Therefore, for complete information the normalization
to 1, 2, 3 or so respectively {see our paper [12] for the case
when one has degrees of dependence between components
or between subcomponents (for refined neutrosophic set
respectively) which are different from 100% or 0%} is
done.

Florentin Smarandache, Classical Logic and Neutrosophic Logic. Answers to K. Georgiev

Neutrosophic Sets and Systems, Vol. 13, 2016

But, for incomplete information and paraconsistent
information, in general, the normalization is not done.
Neutrosophic logic is capable of maintaining modal
operators. The connection between Neutrosophic Logic
and Modal Logic will be shown in a separate paper, since
it is much longer, called Neutrosophic Modal Logic (under
press).
6 Definition of Neutrosophic Logic
In Section 5, paper [1], it is said: “Apparently there
isn’t a clear definition of truth value of the neutrosophic
formulas.” The author is right that “apparently”, but in
reality the definition of neutrosophic logic is very simple
and common sense:
In neutrosophic logic a proposition P has a degree of
truth (T); a degree of indeterminacy (I) that means neither
true nor false, or both true and false, or unknown,
indeterminate; and a degree of falsehood (F); where T, I, F
are subsets (either real numbers, or intervals, or any
subsets) of the interval [0, 1].
What is unclear herein?
In a soccer game, as an easy example, between two
teams, Bulgaria and Romania, there is a degree of truth
about Bulgaria winning, degree of indeterminacy (or
neutrality) of tie game, and degree of falsehood about
Bulgaria being defeated.
7 Neutrosophic Logical Systems
a) Next sentence of Georgiev is
“in every meaningful logical system if A and B are sets
(formulas) such that A ⊆ B then B ‘ A, i.e. when B is
true then A is true.”
(6)
In other words, when B  A (B implies A), and B is
true, then A is true.
This is true for the Boolean logic where one deals with
100% truths, but in modern logics we work with partial
truths.
If an axiom is true in the classical logic, it does not
mean that that axiom has to be true in the modern logical
system. Such counter-example has been provided by
Georgiev himself, who pointed out that the law of double
negation {equation (2)}, which is valid in the classical
logic, is not valid any longer in intuitionistic fuzzy logic.
A similar response we have with respect to his above
statement on the logical system axiom (6): it is partially
true, partially false, and partially indeterminate. All depend
on the types of chosen neutrosophic implication operators.
In neutrosophic logic, let’s consider the neutrosophic
propositions A(tA, iA, fA) and B(tB, iB, fB),
and the neutrosophic implication:
B(tB, iB, fB)  A(tA, iA, fA),
(7)
that has the neutrosophic truth value
(BA)(tBA, iBA, fBA).
(8)
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Again, we have a class of many neutrosophic
implication operators, not only one; see our publication
[13], 2015, pp. 79-81.
Let’s consider one such neutrosophic implication for
single valued neutrosophic logic:
(BA)(tBA, iBA, fBA) is equivalent to B(tB, iB, fB) 
A(tA, iA, fA)
which is equivalent to  B(fB, 1-iB, tB)  A(tA, iA, fA)
which is equivalent to (  B  A)(max{fB, tA}, min{1-iB,
iA}, min{tB, fA}).
(9)
Or:
(tBA, iBA, fBA) = (max{fB, tA}, min{1-iB, iA}, min{tB,
fA}).
(10)
Now, a question arises: what does “(B ) A is true”
mean in fuzzy logic, intuitionistic fuzzy logic, and
respectively in neutrosophic logic?
Similarly for the “B is true”, what does it mean in these
modern logics? Since in these logics we have infinitely
many truth values t(B) ∈ (0, 1); {we made abstraction of
the truth values 0 and 1, which represent the classical
logic}.
b) Theorem 1, by Georgiev, “Either A H k(A) [i.e.
A is true if and only if k(A) is true] or the neutrosophic
logic is contradictory.”
We prove that his theorem is a nonsense.
First at all, the author forgets that when he talks about
neutrosophic logic he is referring to a modern logic, not to
the classical (Boolean) logic. The logical propositions in
neutrosophic logic are partially true, in the form of (t, i, f),
not totally 100% true or (1, 0, 0). Similarly for the
implications and equivalences, they are not classical (i.e.
100% true), but partially true {i.e. their neutrosophic truth
values are in the form of (t, i, f) too}.
The author starts using the previous classical logical system axiom (6), i.e.
“since k(A) ⊆ A we have A ‘ k(A) ” meaning that
A k(A) and when A is true, then k(A) is true.
Next Georgiev’s sentence: “Let assume k(A) be
true and assume that A is not true”.
The same comments as above:
What does it mean in fuzzy logic, intuitionistic fuzzy
logic, and neutrosophic logic that a proposition is true?
Since in these modern logics we have infinitely many
values for the truth value of a given proposition. Does, for
example, t(k(A)) = 0.8 {i.e. the truth value of k(A) is equal
to 0.8}, mean that k(A) is true?
If one takes t(k(A)) = 1, then one falls in the classical
logic.
Similarly, what does it mean that proposition A is not
true? Does it mean that its truth value
t(A) = 0.1 or in general t(A) < 1 ? Since, if one takes
t(A) = 0, then again we fall into the classical logic.
The author confuses the classical logic with modern
logics.
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In his “proof” he states that “since the Neutrosophic logic is not an intuitionistic one,  A should be true
leading to the conclusion that k(  A) =  k(A) is true”.
For the author an “intuitionistic logic” means a logic
that invalidates the double negation law {equation (3)}.
But we have proved before in Section 4, of this paper, that
depending on the type of neutrosophic negation operator
used, one has cases when neutrosophic logic invalidates
the double negation law [hence it is “intuitionistic” in his
words], cases when the neutrosophic logic does not
invalidate the double negation law {formula (2)}, and
indeterminate cases {depending on the new possible
neutrosophic negation operators to be design in the future}.
The author continues with “We found that
k(A)   k(A) is true which means that the simplified neutrosophic logic is contradictory.”
Georgiev messes up the classical logic with modern
logic. In classical logic, indeed
k(A)   k(A) is false, being a contradiction.
But we are surprised that Georgiev does not know that
in modern logic we may have
k(A)   k(A) that is not contradictory, but partially
true and partially false.
For example, in fuzzy logic, let’s say that the truth
value (t) of k(A) is
t(k(A)) = 0.4, then the truth value of its negation,
 k(A), is t(  k(A)) = 1 – 0.4 = 0.6.
Now, we apply the t-norm “min” in order to do the
fuzzy conjunction, and we obtain:
t(k(A)   k(A)) = min{0.4, 0.6} = 0.4 ≠ 0.
Hence, k(A)   k(A) is not a contradiction, since its
truth value is 0.4, not 0. Similarly in intuitionistic fuzzy
logic. The same in neutrosophic logic, for example:
Let the neutrosophic truth value of k(A) be (0.5, 0.4,
0.2), that we denote as:
k(A)(0.5, 0.4, 0.2), then its negation  k(A) will have
the neutrosophic truth value:
 k(A)(0.2, 1-0.4, 0.5) =  k(A)(0.2, 0.6, 0.5).
Let’s do now the neutrosophic conjunction:
k(A)(0.5, 0.4, 0.2)   k(A)(0.2, 0.6, 0.5) =
(k(A)   k(A))(min{0.5, 0.2}, max{0.4, 0.6}, max{0.2,
0.5}) = (k(A)   k(A))(0.2, 0.6, 0.5).
In the same way, k(A)   k(A) is not a contradiction
in neutrosophic logic, since its neutrosophic truth value is
(0.2, 0.6, 0.5), which is different from (0, 0, 1) or from (0,
1, 1). Therefore, Georgiev’s “proof” that the simplified
neutrosophic logic [ = single valued neutrosophic logic] is
a contradiction has been disproved!
His following sentence, “But since the simplified
neutrosophic logic is only a subclass of the neutrosophic
logic, then the neutrosophic logic is a contradiction” is
false. Simplified neutrosophic logic is indeed a subclass of
the neutrosophic logic, but he did not prove that the socalled simplified neutrosophic logic is contradictory (we
have showed above that his “proof” was wrong).

Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that Georgiev’s critics on
the neutrosophic logic are not founded. We made distinctions between the Boolean logic systems and the neutrosophic logic systems.
Neutrosophic logic is developing as a separate entity
with its specific neutrosophic logical systems, neutrosophic
proof theory and their applications.
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